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I. INTRODUCTION
Muslims living in a secular, liberal democratic state face a
fundamental dilemma: reconciling the obligation to live according to
Shari'aI with their civic duty to follow secular laws. 2  Muslims
attempt to resolve this dilemma in a number of ways. Some enter
public office and try to influence the generally applicable laws of their
country. Others advocate greater legal pluralism, thus allowing
Muslims to settle certain disputes under Islamic law. In Canada, for
example, the Islamic Institute for Civil Justice ("IICJ") announced
plans to create Shari'a tribunals and claimed that it would begin
arbitrating family and commercial disputes according to Islamic law.
3
Other Muslims incorporate the laws of Shari'a into their daily affairs
and attempt to structure their private and professional lives in
accordance with the values of their faith.4 Through contract law,
Muslims can arrange marriages, divorces, child custody disputes,
financial investments, wills, and professional relationships in
accordance with Islamic law. In this way, Muslims can accomplish
their dual obligation: to abide by Shari'a and to help ensure that other
Muslims do so as well.
1. Shari'a is the will of God and is manifested in Islamic law.
2. Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Religious Voice in the Public Square: Muslim Minorities and
Self Restraint in Liberal Democracies, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1525, 1530-31 (1996).
3. For a description of these Shari'a tribunals, see DeNeen L. Brown, Canadians Allow
Islamic Courts to Decide Disputes, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2004, at 14A. These tribunals are
possible due to the passage of the Arbitration Act that allows individuals to settle their disputes
according to religious law. The Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 S.O., ch. 17 (Can.). Muslims may
take advantage of these tribunals to settle issues such as inheritance, divorce, and commercial
contract disputes. Religious tribunals, however, may not hear criminal matters or disputes
involving third parties. Although the IICJ has not officially started arbitrating cases, it has
started training arbitrators in both Shari'a and Canadian law. The IICJ's proposal to create
Shari'a tribunals has generated a nation-wide controversy on whether the laws of Shari'a are
compatible with the liberal Western values. Opponents of these tribunals claim that these
tribunals will discriminate against Muslim women. Although the arbitration process is
voluntary, many Muslim women may be coerced into unfavorable arbitration by religious leaders
or family members. On the other hand, proponents of arbitration argue that the law should
afford Muslims the same opportunity to adjudicate disputes according to religious law as other
religious minorities currently have. Jews, for example, have been quietly arbitrating similar
cases for a number of years. Supporters of arbitration argue that Shari'a is compatible with
Western values and that this Arbitration Act will allow Western minded Muslims in Canada to
develop a more liberal form of Shari'a than is currently practiced in many countries of the Middle
East. For more information, see Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law:
Examining Ontario's Arbitration Act and its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. RTS.
Art. 7 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/mwjhr/voll/issl/art7/.
4. The rapidly expanding field of Islamic finance is evidence of the emerging desire to live
in accordance with Shari'a. The current level of Shari'a compliant investment is about $260
billion, and the Islamic finance industry is growing at a rate of 15 to 20 percent a year. James
Hume, Islamic Finance: Provenance and Prospects, 2004 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 48, 48 (May 2004).
ISLAMIC ARBITRATION
Judicial interpretation and enforcement of contracts that
incorporate religious law, however, can raise constitutional problems,
especially when the religious law is unfamiliar to most U.S. judges.
Consider the following two examples. Two parties draft a contract in
which the buyer agrees to purchase ten bushels of wheat from a
farmer. The contract authorizes the farmer to deliver the wheat in
two months time, and the buyer agrees to pay the market price for the
wheat at the time of delivery. The contract stipulates that Shari'a
governs the rights and obligations of the two parties. A month before
the anticipated wheat harvest, the price of wheat increases and the
buyer wishes to void the contract, arguing that the contract violated
the prohibition of gharar5 (uncertainty) because it did not specify the
price for the wheat. The seller disagrees and sues the buyer for
breach of contract.
A judge presiding over this dispute would first turn to state
contract law to determine whether there is a valid contract and what
the precise terms of the contract are. Assuming a contract exists, the
judge must ascertain the intent of the parties. Since the two persons
explicitly stated that they wish Islamic law to govern their contractual
obligations, the judge would then determine whether the existence of
gharar would allow one party to void the contract under Islamic law.
Finally, the judge would have to decide whether the slight uncertainty
created by the small fluctuations in wheat prices would violate the
prohibition of gharar, thus allowing the buyer to void the contract.
This is a difficult task for judges who may be unfamiliar with Islamic
law. More significantly, as argued in this Note, such a task may
require a judge to overstep her First Amendment constraints.
In the second example, a Muslim man and woman sign a
prenuptial agreement stating that upon the husband's divorce of his
wife under Islamic law, the husband will pay the wife a certain
amount of money. The contract further clarifies that a divorce shall
be binding under Islamic law upon the declaration of the triple talaq.6
5. Islamic law prohibits uncertainty in contracts because uncertainty creates an imbalance
in the benefits that each party will receive. If the price of wheat, for example, goes up, then the
seller will receive a benefit at the cost of the buyer. Likewise, if it goes down, the buyer will
receive an additional benefit. Shari'a seeks to maintain a strict balance of benefits between the
contracting parties. NAYLA COMAIR-OBEID, THE LAW OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS IN THE ARAB
MIDDLE EAST 55-64 (Mark S. W. Hoyle ed., Kluwer Law International 1996).
6. Under Islamic law, the man lawfully divorces his wife by pronouncing the talaq ("I
divorce you") three times. Jurists disagree, however, whether this statement uttered three times
consecutively amounts to a single or a triple talaq. MOHAMMED HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 391 (The Islamic Texts Society, 3d ed. 2003) (1989). In India, for
example, local Islamic jurists took an extreme position on this question, declaring that a man
who uttered the talaq three times in his sleep lawfully divorced his wife. The jurists told the
couple that if they wished to remarry, the woman would have to marry another man, spend a
2006]
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Five years later, in a state of rage, the husband declares: "I divorce
you; I divorce you; I divorce you." After the husband calms down, he
apologizes and asks for forgiveness. The woman, believing that her
husband has lawfully divorced her under Islamic law, divorces him in
state court and sues for specific performance of the contract. The
judge must decide whether the condition precedent to the contract, the
declaration of a triple talaq, had occurred. Ultimately, the judge
would have to decide whether the excited utterances of the phrase "I
divorce you" count as a single talaq or as a triple talaq under Islamic
law.
Adjudicating these contract disputes raises significant
constitutional and pragmatic concerns, which courts and the academy
have not adequately recognized. This Note argues that the First
Amendment limits courts' ability to interpret contracts that contain
Islamic legal terms or stipulate that Islamic law governs the
performance of the contract. Although judges must heed the First
Amendment restraints when interpreting contracts that incorporate
religious terms or law, First Amendment concerns are especially
prevalent with Islamic legal contracts for several reasons. Islam,
unlike other major religions, does not distinguish between the divine
and the secular, making it difficult for judges to avoid examination of
religious terms. Moreover, there is no single authoritative
interpretation of Islamic law or doctrine, which creates problems for
judges attempting to interpret Islamic law.
This Note concludes that judges should be cautious in
interpreting disputed Islamic legal terms or in applying Islamic law
for two reasons. First, the interpretation of an Islamic legal term may
necessarily entail a determination of religious doctrine, which the
First Amendment prohibits. 7 Muslims who incorporate Islamic legal
terms into contracts often desire those terms to be interpreted in
accordance with Shari'a. Therefore, a judge cannot merely look to the
parties' understanding of the terms or to the terms' plain (or secular)
meaning. Instead, a judge must look to their religious meaning, which
is often uncertain or disputed by Muslim jurists.
Second, judicial determinations of the meaning of Islamic legal
terms may frustrate the intent of the parties and impose obligations
night with him, and then obtain a lawful divorce. This decision has been widely criticized. Sleep
"Divorce' Counts, CNN, March 26, 2006 at http://edition.cnn.com2006WORLD/
asiapcfl03/27/india.religion.reutindex.html.
7. See discussion infra Part III.A. A religious contract includes any contract that: (1)
stipulates that a religious law will determine the rights and obligations under the contract; (2)




that the contracting parties did not contemplate. Muslims often do
not share a mutual understanding of the laws of Shari'a or the precise
definitions of religious terms. Indeed, under Islamic law, the parties'
will or intent does not determine their rights under the contract. Once
the contract has been formed Shari'a defines their rights,8 and
Muslims depend on religious scholars, not judges, to clarify these
rights.
Part II of this Note provides a brief summary of contract law
and summarizes the canons of construction that judges may use to
ascertain the intent and mutual understanding of the parties when
the contract was formed. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence and the limits that it places on judges as
they attempt to interpret religious contracts. This Part describes the
development of the "neutral-principles" doctrine and examines how
courts have applied this doctrine to three different types of religious
contract disputes. Part IV addresses whether judges can successfully
apply the neutral-principles doctrine to resolve controversies
regarding Islamic law. This Part first provides some background
information on Islamic law and jurisprudence. Next, it examines how
courts have attempted, and failed, to apply the neutral-principles
doctrine to Islamic contract disputes. Part V suggests that, although
judges may not interpret Islamic law, they may imply an arbitration
clause into these disputed contracts. Such an approach helps enforce
the parties' original intent and reconciles the states' interest in
adjudicating disputes with the First Amendment's prohibition against
excessive state entanglement with religion.
II. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A judge's primary goal in interpreting a contract is to ascertain
the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract. The Second
Restatement of Contracts states that the "objective of interpretation in
the general law of contracts is to carry out the understanding of the
parties rather than to impose obligations on them contrary to their
understanding."9  Words, however, are often susceptible to varying
interpretations. The meaning of a word depends on its verbal context
and the surrounding circumstances. 10 A judge may not always be able
8. See COMAIR-OBEID, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that "[o]nce the contractual process has
been set in motion, the effects of the contract.., are produced immediately, as the shari'a has
provided and not as the parties have agreed").
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. c (1978).
10. Even the so called "plain meaning" of the word is subject to extrinsic factors such as
education, experience, and common usage of the speaker or interpreter. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
20061 613
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to discover the intent of the parties from the mere words themselves
and their arrangement within the contract.
Judges have thus developed canons of construction for
interpreting contracts. If the language of the contract is plain and
unambiguous, judges may give effect to the prevailing meaning of the
language unless another intention is manifested in light of the
circumstances of the contract.11 If a term is ambiguous, or fairly
susceptible to different interpretations, judges may look to the course
of performance between the two parties, the course of dealing, and the
general usages of trade. 12  If the intent of the parties is still
unascertainable, judges can resort to statutory or common law rules to
fill in the gaps of the contract. Although judges should strive to give
effect to the mutual intent of the contracting parties, they may never
be able to discern the subjective intent of each party. Thus, the party
urging an interpretation different from the plain meaning, or the
meaning indicated from the context of the contract, bears the burden
of proof in showing she intended such a meaning.
Canons of construction aid judges in interpreting secular
contracts. With religious contracts, however, several factors may
hinder judicial interpretation. First, judges may be unfamiliar with
the common meaning of religious terms, or a religious term may not
have a prevailing meaning due to the diversity of religious beliefs.
Second, and more importantly, judges are bound by the constraints of
the First Amendment. Judges are required to maintain the
separation between church and state, and therefore may not be able to
make determinations regarding the meaning of religious language or
law as requested by the contracting parties. The next Part will
discuss in depth the First Amendment constraints on the
interpretation of religious contracts. It will also analyze the methods
that judges have employed to interpret and enforce such contracts.
v. G.W. Tomas & Drayage Rigging Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (stating that "[t]he
meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the verbal context and surrounding
circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and
their hearers or readers"). Justice Holmes commented, "A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Town v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).





III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. General Constraints on Government Action
Judicial enforcement of religious contracts raises important
First Amendment questions and concerns. The religion clauses of the
First Amendment are commonly referred to as the "Establishment
Clause" and the "Free Exercise Clause."13 The Establishment Clause
forbids the government from establishing or supporting any religion,
and the Free Exercise Clause forbids the government from interfering
with an individual's liberty to practice his or her religion of choice.
14
Although some religious advocates view the Establishment Clause as
an impediment to religion, the drafters of the Constitution
incorporated both clauses into the First Amendment to preserve the
sanctity and freedom of religion. 15 The framers of the Constitution
believed that the separation of church and state was essential to
preserve religious "liberty for themselves and for their posterity" and
to allow for the growth and development of religion. 16 More recently,
Justice Blackmun stated that the Establishment Clause is based on
the belief that "religious freedom cannot thrive in the absence of a
vibrant religious community and that such a community cannot
prosper when it is bound to the secular."17
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the
Establishment Clause is in a state of disarray. 18 Despite the
importance of the Establishment Clause, the Court only started to
clarify its meaning in the past half-century, beginning with Everson v.
Board of Education19 in 1947. In this case, Justice Black proclaimed
13. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS 643 (West Group, 3d ed. 2001) (1991). The First Amendment states, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although the Constitution only refers to Congress, the Supreme Court has
historically viewed the First Amendment as a restraint on all government action. See Waston v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872) ("Any other than [ecclesiastical courts] must be incompetent judges of
matters of faith, discipline, and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to
attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction, would
only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would do anything but improve
either religion or good morals.").
14. SHIFFRIN & CHOPER, supra note 13, at 643-45.
15. Id. at 644-45.
16. Id. at 644.
17. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992).
18. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 782 (1998).
19. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2006] 615
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the need for strict separation: "The First Amendment has erected a
wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable."20  In subsequent cases, the Court acknowledged that
strict separation is not feasible in a country deeply rooted in religious
tradition, and that some relationship between government and
religion is inevitable. Thus, the Establishment Clause only requires
that the government maintain "a course of neutrality among religions,
and between religion and nonreligion."
21
In the 1971 decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court adopted
a three-prong approach to evaluate the constitutionality of state or
federal action under the Establishment Clause.22 Under the "Lemon
Test," state action is permissible only if it: (1) has a secular purpose;
(2) does not have a primary effect of promoting or inhibiting religion;
and (3) does not excessively entangle the government with religion.
23
Although the Court has never overruled Lemon, a majority of
the current Justices have expressed their dissatisfaction with the test
and prefer a more nuanced, case-by-case approach for evaluating state
action under the Establishment Clause.24 In recent years, the Lemon
Test has undergone several important changes. First, the Court has
de-emphasized the "purpose" prong and has generally deferred to a
state's articulated secular purpose. 25 Second, the Court has collapsed
the second and third prongs, viewing "excessive entanglement" as one
criterion in assessing whether the statute has the primary "effect" of
advancing or inhibiting religion. Justice O'Connor explained this shift
by noting that "the factors we use to assess whether an entanglement
is 'excessive' are similar to the factors we use to examine 'effect'."26
20. Id. at 18.
21. Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985). The requirement for government neutrality
in religion is firmly established in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971) (stating that the "Establishment Clause forbids subtle
departures from neutrality, 'religious gerrymanders,' as well as obvious abuses"); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (stating that "a law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest"); Rosenberger v. Rectors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839-40 (1995) (discussing and
applying the requirement of religious neutrality); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810-13 (2000)
(same).
22. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
23. Id.
24. Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 784. In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice Burger wrote that the
Court has "repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion
in this sensitive area." 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
25. Justice Scalia has repeatedly criticized the first prong of the test, arguing that
"discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always
an impossible task." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).
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She concluded that it is best to "treat [entanglement] as an aspect of
the inquiry into a statute's effect."
27
Thus, the Court now focuses primarily on whether the state
action has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. One of the
primary concerns under the "effects" inquiry is whether the state
action endorses religion. In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O'Connor
wrote that state endorsement of religion is unconstitutional because it
"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."28 In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinnete,
O'Connor added that the state can violate the Establishment Clause
even when the endorsement is unintended: "Where the government's
operation of a public forum has the effect of endorsing religion, even if
the governmental actor neither intends nor actively encourages that
result, the Establishment Clause is violated. ' 29 The Establishment
Clause not only prohibits the endorsement of religion in general, but
also the endorsement of one sect's beliefs over another's. In Larson v.
Valente, the Court reaffirmed that the "government must be neutral
when it comes to competition between sects."
30
Although the Court has largely focused on the "effects" prong in
evaluating the constitutionality of legislative and executive acts,
judicial action poses unique concerns regarding state entanglement
with religion. As one commentator noted, "judicial resolution of
theological or ecclesiastical disputes, even when necessary to resolve
litigation, would impermissibly entangle the government in the affairs
of religion."31 In Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia
expressed similar concerns, stating that judges must abstain from
evaluating both the "validity of particular litigants' interpretations of
[religious beliefs]" and the "relative merits of differing religious
claims." 32 He added that "in many different contexts, we have warned
that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular
belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim."33
Aside from these First Amendment restraints, the Supreme
Court has recognized a pragmatic reason for refraining from
27. Id. at 233.
28. 465 U.S. at 688.
29. 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995).
30. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
31. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 132.




adjudicating religious disputes: courts are generally not competent to
resolve religious questions, which are better left to religious bodies.
Justice Souter once noted that he could "hardly imagine a subject less
amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or more
deliberately to be avoided where possible. ' 34  In light of these
concerns, many lower courts have simply "dismissed a wide range of
otherwise ordinary disputes, whenever their resolution would require
examination of religious matters."3 5
Despite these constitutional and pragmatic concerns, the First
Amendment does not bar all judicial involvement in religious disputes.
In the 1970s, a series of church property disputes forced the Court to
articulate an approach for adjudicating controversies that concern
religion or religious organizations. In these cases, the Court
consistently held that civil courts may not determine ecclesiastical
questions in the process of resolving property disputes 36 but may apply
"neutral principles" of property and contract law. 37
In Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, the first of this series
of cases, the Court held that civil courts could not lend their
enforcement power to one side of a debate over religious doctrine or
dogma. 38 In this case, a dispute arose when two local churches voted
to withdraw from the Presbyterian Church on the grounds that it had
departed from its original doctrine. 39 The two local churches then sued
in Georgia state court to enjoin the general church from trespassing
on their property. The trial court instructed the jury to determine
whether the actions of the Presbyterian Church amounted to a
"fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original tenets and
doctrines of the [Presbyterian Church] so that the new tenets and
doctrines are utterly variant from the purposes for which the
34. Lee, 505 U.S. at 616-17.
35. Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine? Judicial Authority to
Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 498 (2005) (noting that courts
have dismissed a broad array of cases, including contract disputes, child custody, negligence
claims, consumer fraud, and employment discrimination, because the resolution of these disputes
would require the examination of religious matters). Several commentators have compared
courts' reluctance to adjudicate religious disputes to the judiciary's political question doctrine:
"[T]he prohibition on judicial inquiry into religious questions is understood to be a justiciability
doctrine-once it becomes apparent that the resolution of a case would require a court to
undertake an examination of religious matters, the court has no choice but to dismiss the case."
Id. at 499; Gedicks, supra note 31, at 132.
36. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. & Can.
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976).
37. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.
38. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
39. Id. at 442.
618 [Vol. 59:2:609
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[Presbyterian Church] was founded."40 The jury found in favor of the
local church, and the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the decision. 41
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court's
decision. First, it acknowledged that states do have "a legitimate
interest in resolving property disputes, and that a civil court is the
proper forum for that resolution. '42  It added, however, that this
interest is subject to the constraints of the First Amendment. The
Court noted that the separation of church and state provides religious
bodies with the freedom from having their doctrines and beliefs judged
or defined by civil courts and that this freedom is clearly jeopardized
when litigation turns on a court's resolution of controversies over
religious practice or doctrine. Consequently, the Court found that civil
courts have "no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the
process of resolving property disputes."43
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox v. Milivojevich, the Court
reaffirmed the approach it took in Hull Church.44 Milivojevich, a
church bishop, sued the diocese claiming that it had improperly
suspended and defrocked him.45 The Illinois Supreme Court found
that the bishop's removal was arbitrary and in violation of the
church's constitution and penal code. 46 In 1976, the Supreme Court
reversed this decision on the grounds that it constituted
unconstitutional judicial review of a religious controversy. The Court
held that the First Amendment mandates that courts accept the
decisions of a church's ecclesiastical tribunal "where resolution of the
disputes cannot be made by the civil courts without extensive inquiry
into religious law and polity. ..."47
The neutral-principles doctrine, adopted in 1979 in Jones v.
Wolf, serves as the modern approach to judicial resolution of religious
disputes.48 In Jones, a dispute arose after the Vineville Presbyterian
Church ("VPC") voted to separate from the Presbyterian Church of the
United States ("PCUS"). The PCUS refused to recognize the schism,
and a dispute broke out over who controlled the church and its
property. A Georgia state court found in favor of VPC after
40. Id. at 444-45.
41. Id. (citing Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church,
224 Ga. 61 (1968)).
42. Id. at 445.
43. Id. at 446.
44. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10
(1976).
45. Id. at 697-98.
46. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 387 N.E.2d 285 (1979).
47. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709.
48. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
2006]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
determining that it could employ neutral principles of law to resolve
the dispute. 49 The Supreme Court affirmed that a state court could
use the neutral-principles approach, or any other approach, as long as
it involves "no consideration of doctrinal matters."50 The Court added
that the "primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are
that it is completely secular in operation and yet flexible enough to
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity."51
Furthermore, it "promises to free civil courts completely from
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.
'52
The Court warned, however, that civil courts must be extremely
careful to examine and interpret documents in purely secular terms,
and to avoid relying on religious meanings or precepts.
53
After Hull Church, Serbian Eastern Orthodox, and Jones, it is
clear that civil courts cannot independently interpret religious terms
when such interpretation requires consideration or determination of
religious doctrine.5 4 Nevertheless, courts do have an interest in
settling certain religious disputes and may adjudicate these disputes
by using one of two methods. First, courts can defer to religious
institutions that have the authority to decide the underlying doctrinal
issues. Second, courts can apply neutral principles of law to
adjudicate the secular aspects of the dispute, so long as this does not
entail consideration of religious doctrine. Although the neutral-
principles approach helped clarify the extent to which lower courts
could adjudicate certain disputes, this approach has generated some
confusion, especially when applied to Islamic contracts.
B. Applying Neutral Principles to Private Contract Disputes
The neutral-principles approach was created as a tool for
courts to use in adjudicating church property disputes. In recent
years, states have extended the doctrine to resolve other religious
49. Id. at 600. Neutral principles of law include the sources of law and methods of legal
analysis that courts use to adjudicate secular disputes. In this case, the Court stated that the
"approach entails settling property disputes on the basis of the language of the deeds, the terms
of the local church charters, [and] the state statutes governing the holding of church property. Id.
at 603.
50. Id. at 602.
51. Id. at 603.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 604.
54. Goldstein, supra note 35, at 513 (noting that "[c]ases following Presbyterian Church ...




contract disputes. Using the neutral-principles doctrine, courts can
adjudicate religious disputes in three different circumstances.
1. Purely Secular Obligations
Courts can constitutionally enforce the secular obligations in
contracts between religious organizations or individuals. If religious
persons or organizations dispute the secular provisions of a contract,
the court may apply neutral principles of contract law and resolve the
dispute in accordance with state contract law. Using neutral
principles, the court applies well-defined, objective, and secular rules
of law, thereby avoiding any impermissible inquiry into religious
doctrine. The fact that the contract involves religious entities or the
rendering of religious duties does not preclude enforcement of its
secular provisions.
In Reardon v. Lemoyne, for example, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found that it could assert jurisdiction over a contract
dispute between four nuns and Sacred Heart School, a school
administered by the Catholic Church.55 After the school informed the
nuns that it did not plan to renew their contract for the following year,
the nuns filed a petition for declaratory judgment requesting that the
court construe their employment contracts. 56  Although certain
provisions of the contract referenced canonical law and matters of
religious doctrine, the court found that other parts of the contract,
including the procedures for employee dismissal, were purely
secular.57 It concluded, "We believe [the interpretation of the contract]
can be facilitated by keeping in mind the distinction between non-
doctrinal matters, wherein jurisdiction lies, and matters involving
doctrine, faith, or internal organizations, which are insulated from
judicial inquiry."58
2. Parties Agree on Religious Terms
Courts can enforce the terms of a contract when neither party
disputes the meaning of the religious terms. In this scenario, the
court may apply neutral principles of contract law to enforce the
secular terms as well as the undisputed religious terms. Since the
parties agree on the meaning of the religious terms or the application
of religious law, the judge does not have to make a determination of
55. 454 A.2d 428, 432-434 (N.H. 1982).
56. Id. at 429-30.
57. Id. at 432-33.
58. Id. at 433-34.
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religious doctrine. The judge merely enforces what the parties
previously agreed upon. Thus, the court does not entangle itself in
religion or unconstitutionally endorse one view of religion over
another.
This theory was first expounded in 1983, in Avitzur v. Avitzur.
In Avitzur, a Jewish couple signed a Ketubah (a Jewish marriage
document) as part of their wedding ceremony. 59  The Ketubah
expressed the couple's desire to live "in accordance with the Jewish
law of marriage throughout [their] lifetime. '60 The couple divorced
twelve years later, and the wife sought specific performance of the
Ketubah agreement, which required the husband to appear before the
Bet Din (a rabbinical court) and receive a Get (a Jewish divorce). The
husband refused to obtain the Get and argued before the state court
that specific performance of the religious agreement would excessively
entangle the state and religion.
The court found that although the contractual obligations were
grounded in religious belief, this did not "preclude enforcement." 61 It
added that because the relief sought by the plaintiff was merely to
compel the defendant to perform a contractual obligation, it did not
need to decide any doctrinal issues. 62 The court found that requiring
specific performance of the Ketubah was constitutional because the
matter could be "decided solely upon the application of neutral
principles of contract law, without any reference to any religious
principle."63
3. Parties Agree to Have Meaning Supplied by Religious Authority
Courts may enforce contracts where the parties disagree on the
meaning of religious terms or on the application of religious law, but
agree to adopt the meaning supplied by a religious authority or
arbitrator.64 The Supreme Court laid the foundation for religious
59. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 139.
62. Id.
63. Id. The dissent argued that specific performance of the contract would violate the First
Amendment. The judge noted that judicial intervention in disputes with respect to religious law
is constitutionally proscribed, unless the issue can be resolved without any reference to religious
dogma or doctrine. The controversy before the court, however, could not be resolved without
making such references. The judge emphatically argued that "determination of the content and
particulars of rights of the wife or the obligations of the husband under the contract cannot be
made without inquiry into and resolution of questions of Jewish religious law and tradition." Id.
at 141.
64. Parties may contractually agree to resort to religious arbitration if any dispute arises
over the performance of a contract, or they may contractually agree to religious arbitration of an
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arbitration in Serbian Orthodox Diocese by stating that questions of
discipline or faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law must be decided
by church authorities, and that such decisions are binding on the
courts.6 5 This opinion clearly implied that courts may give effect to
determinations of religious law as long as the court itself does not
make the determination.
Religious arbitration is gaining popularity in the United
States, and courts have generally enforced arbitration clauses in
contracts. 66  In most religious arbitration cases, the parties
contractually agree to refer contractual disputes to a religious
authority or arbitrator.67 The parties can also contractually agree to
the laws, including religious law or scripture, that govern any dispute
over the contract. The arbitrator has the authority to apply the
specified religious law and grant whatever remedy or relief is within
the scope of the parties' agreement.68 A party can then seek judicial
enforcement of the arbitration award if the opposing party does not
comply with the relief granted by the arbitrator. A civil court must
enforce the award unless a party presents grounds to vacate the
award, such as evidence that the parties did not intend the dispute to
go to arbitration, evidence of a procedural defect in the arbitration
process, evidence that the award violates state or federal law, or
evidence that the award is unconscionable or against public policy.
69
existing dispute. In both cases, the court may be requested to enforce the decision of the
arbitrator if one party refuses to comply with the terms of the award.
65. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709
(1976).
66. Although Muslims have been informally arbitrating religious claims for years, only
recently have they sought judicial enforcement of Islamic arbitration clauses. For an example of
an Islamic arbitration clause, see Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004):
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with or relating to
this Agreement or any breach or alleged breach hereof shall, upon the request of any
party involved, be submitted to and settled by arbitration before the Arbitration Court
of an Islamic mosque located in the State of Minnesota pursuant to the laws of Islam
(or at any other place or under any other form of arbitration mutually acceptable to
the parties so involved). Any award rendered shall be final and conclusive upon the
parties.
The court in Abd Alla enforced the arbitration award and stated that "[a]rbitration awards are
strongly favored and a reviewing court must exercise '[e]very reasonable presumption' in favor of
the arbitration award's finality and validity." Id. at 573 (quoting State Office of State Auditor v.
Minn. Ass'n of Prof'l Employees, 504 N.W.2d 751, 754 (Minn. 1993)).
67. Religious arbitration generally mirrors other forms of alternative dispute resolution but
requires application of religious law instead of secular law.
68. Glenn G. Waddell & Judith M. Keegan, Christian Conciliation: An Alternative to
"Ordinary"ADR, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 592-93 (1999).
69. Id. at 604.
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One federal district court recently addressed the First
Amendment concerns in enforcing religious arbitration awards, and
determined that judicial enforcement is, in fact, constitutional.7 0 In
Encore Productions v. Promise Keepers, Encore Productions ("EP")
contractually agreed with Promise Keepers ("PK"), a Christian
evangelical organization, to provide production and consulting services
for a number of PK's religious meetings and conferences.7 1 The
contract contained an arbitration provision stating that any dispute
would be settled by mediation and, if necessary, legally binding
arbitration. The contract also stated that the arbitration would be
conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for Christian
Conciliation, and thus the "Holy Scriptures shall be the supreme
authority governing every aspect of the conciliation process."72
A dispute arose, and the parties sought arbitration. After the
completion of the arbitration, EP challenged the outcome, arguing
that the religious arbitration violated the First Amendment. The
Federal District Court for the District of Colorado held that the
arbitration award was enforceable because it was a secular contract
right.73  The court acknowledged that it must "diligently avoid
impermissible First Amendment entanglement" but found that it
could employ neutral principles to enforce the arbitration award since
the arbitration clause itself did not require inquiry into or a
determination of religious doctrine. 74 The court added that although it
could not force parties to settle disputes through religious tribunals, if
parties agreed to do so, then it would be proper for the court to enforce
the agreement.
7 5
4. Impermissible Enforcement and Interpretation: Parties Disagree on
Terms
Courts may not enforce religious contracts when the
contracting parties disagree on the meaning of a religious term, the
70. See Encore Prods., Inc., v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999)
(holding that enforcement of religious arbitration awards is constitutional); see also Prescott v.
Northlake Christian School, 244 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D. La. 2002) (same), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 369 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004).
71. Encore Prods., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
72. Id. at 1106, 1111 (quoting Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation 4).
73. Id. at 1112.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court added that it might be unconstitutional to not enforce such an arbitration
award because a party could claim "impedance of the practice of religion or creation of an unjust
bias against religion, thereby depriving the [party] of its free exercise rights." Id. at 1113.
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application of religious law, or an issue of religious doctrine. 76 As one
commentator noted, "Cases following Presbyterian Church ...
eliminate any residual authority for courts to construe religious terms,
however clearly expressed"77 because this would require courts to
consider 78 or make a determination of religious doctrine. Such a task
deviates from the neutral-principles approach and unconstitutionally
entangles the state and religion.7 9 When asked to construe a disputed
religious term or apply disputed religious law, the court must either
dismiss the suit or, when possible, defer to the religious institution
with the authority to decide the underlying doctrinal dispute.
IV. APPLYING NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES TO ISLAMIC CONTRACTS
The neutral-principles doctrine has helped clarify which sorts
of disputes courts may adjudicate without excessively entangling
church and state. Although this doctrine was first used to adjudicate
church property disputes, several courts have extended the neutral-
principles doctrine to resolve religious-based contract disputes
between individuals. It may not be possible, however, to successfully
apply neutral principles of law to interpret contracts that contain
Islamic legal terms. The interpretation of Islamic legal terms raises
unique constitutional concerns. First, as explained in more depth
infra, there is no separation between the secular and the religious in
Islamic law, making it difficult for a court to only examine the "purely
secular terms"8 0 of the contract. Second, when interpreting Islamic
legal terms, courts must necessarily make determinations of religious
doctrine because there is no single authoritative opinion in Islam. This
determination may also unconstitutionally endorse one school's
interpretation of Islamic law over another's. To better understand
these concerns, it is important to briefly look at the theory and
development of Islamic law.
76. See McEnroy v. St. Meinrad Sch. of Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over a contract dispute between a religious
school and a teacher because the court would have to determine whether the teacher's actions
violated canonical law).
77. Goldstein, supra note 35, at 513.
78. Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (stating that only "express terms" that "may be effected without
consideration of doctrine are civilly enforceable").
79. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (holding that courts may apply neutral
principles of law to resolve contract disputes but may not determine matters of religious
doctrine); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709
(1976).
80. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
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A. Overview of Islamic Law
1. Shari'a: God's Law
Islam encompasses two primary spheres of study: theology and
Shari'a. The former teaches Muslims what to believe while the latter
instructs Muslims how to behave. Literally, "shari'a" means "the path
or the way." In the religious sense, it means the path of God or the
path that God has created for man to follow.8 ' Shari'a is not simply a
body of law; it is a moral code and a way of life. The famous Islamic
scholar Joseph Schacht wrote, "The sacred Law of Islam is an all-
embracing body of religious duties, the totality of Allah's commands
that regulate the life of every Muslim in all its aspects."8 2 Despite its
importance, there is no single, comprehensive understanding of
Shari'a. The Shari'a is not specifically set forth in the Qur'an, and
there is no ecclesiastical authority in Islam.8 3 Accordingly, Shari'a is
best understood as the elusive and abstract concept of God's will.84
Knowledge of Shari'a comes from both revealed and
nonrevealed sources. Muslims look primarily to the Qur'an and the
Sunna, the oral tradition of the Prophet Muhammad documented in
the hadith.8 5  These two sources alone do not explicitly provide
guidance for all of the problems that Muslims encounter, and thus
81. The religious sense of the term Shari'a comes from verse 5:48 in the Qur'an: 'To each
among you have We prescribed a law and an open way."
82. JOSEPH SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964).
83. There is no single religious authority in Sunni Islam. Likewise, no person or religious
organization can provide a comprehensive understanding of Islamic law. Instead, Islam charges
each Muslim with the obligation to live according to his understanding of God's will. Individuals,
however, must abide by two stipulations in forming their understanding of Shari'a. First, their
"personal understanding must be consciously and reflectively held." El Fadl, supra note 2, at
1527. Second, they must adhere to and adopt ijma, or understandings of Shari'a that have been
unanimously agreed upon by the Muslim community. Id. Legal authority among the minority
Shi'a will not be addressed in this Note.
84. Id.
85. SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 202. The Sunna is the example set forth by Mohammed and
is known through his acts and his sayings regarding the details of daily life. Although all law
ultimately comes from God, the Sunna plays a prominent role in Islamic law because Mohammed
was God's spokesperson in the secular world, and thus Muslims believe that his actions and
beliefs were divinely inspired. Mohammed's sayings are called the hadith. The hadith was
originally transmitted orally, but was recorded in the middle of the 8th century in order to limit
falsification and provide a degree of uniformity throughout the empire. The Sunna is the primary
source of Islamic law because of its breadth and its focus on the details and issues that confront
Muslims in every day life. CAESAR E. FARAH, ISLAM 186 (6th ed. 2000).
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Muslims also turn to ijma86 (the unanimous agreement of the
community) and qiyas, (a systemized process of analogical reasoning
regarding matters that are not specifically covered by the Qur'an or
the Hadith) to ascertain Shari'a.8 7 Finally, some schools of thought
believe that urf (custom), istihsan (juristic preference), istihsab
(presumption of continuity in juristic reasoning), and maslaha (public
welfare) are all permissible tools of reasoning.88 The entire process of
attempting to gain knowledge of God's will by applying the
jurisprudential tools to the sacred sources is known as ijtihad
(striving).8
9
Islamic law, or fiqh,90 is the body of law derived from the
religious sources according to these methods and procedures. Fiqh is
the "knowledge of the practical rules of Shari'a acquired from the
detailed evidence in the sources."91  It embodies the results of over
1,400 years of Islamic jurisprudence and represents the Muslim
community's attempt to extract God's will through analysis of the
sacred sources. 92 Essentially, fiqh sets forth the concrete expressions
of Shari'a, or God's will.
Throughout the history of Islam, Islamic jurists have disagreed
as to the appropriate interpretations of the rules of Shari'a and as to
the methods of deriving those rules from the sacred sources. 93 In the
formative period of Islamic law, hundreds of madhabs (schools of
thought) sprang up across the Islamic empire, all with divergent
versions of fiqh. The vast majority of these schools eventually expired,
leaving only four remaining schools: Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and
Shafi. 94 Although these schools have reached consensus on many of
86. Support for ijma comes principally from the following hadith: "My community shall
never agree on an error." KAMALI, supra note 6, at 2 (citing Ibn Majah, Sunan, II, 1303, hadith
no. 3950).
87. DAVID WAINES, AN INTRODUCTION To ISLAM 83-84 (2d ed. 2003).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 65.
90. Joseph Schacht writes that the "term fiqh 'knowledge', shows that early Islam regarded
knowledge of the sacred Law as the knowledge par excellence." SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 1.
91. KAMALI, supra note 6, at 2.
92. Id.
93. SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 3.
94. These schools exert influence over separate regions of the world, although Muslims are
free to subscribe to any one of the schools. The Maliki school, predominant in northwestern
Africa, adopts a strict reliance on the Sunna of the prophet, but also regards the public interest
in decisionmaking. The Hanbali school, predominant in the Gulf states, is known for a strict
interpretation of the Qur'an. The Al-Shafi school, predominant in Egypt, is famous for limiting
the scope of the Sunna to the practice of the Prophet himself. Al-Shafi, however, was also famous
for adopting analogical reasoning and restricting the use of independent reasoning. The Hanafi
school, also predominant in Egypt, relies on analogical reasoning as well as istihsan where strict
application of analogy would yield harsh results. WAINES, supra note 87, at 65-74.
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the fundamental principles of Islamic law, they employ slightly
different theories of usul al-fiqh (jurisprudence) thus yielding different
interpretations of Shari'a. Since there is no ultimate religious
authority in Sunni Islam, these schools' interpretations of Islamic law
are considered equally valid.
95
The four schools of law developed the corpus of Islamic law
through the compilation of questions and advisory answers.
96
Throughout the history of Islam, a Muslim seeking a solution to a
problem or advice on the religious value of an action would present his
question to a mufti (religious scholar). The mufti would then perform
independent ijtihad or consult the established legal opinions in his
school of law before issuing an opinion on the legality of such action.
These opinions, or fatwas, are only advisory and thus do not bind the
individual seeking the solution to the problem. 97 Well-established
fatwas are incorporated into the school's fiqh and are often adopted by
subsequent muftis when asked to address similar questions. 98 By this
process, Islamic law has developed primarily from legal opinions
issued (by non-state actors) to help Muslims evaluate their actions
through God's eyes rather than from a series of laws designed to
address social concerns or alter behavior ex ante.99
2. Islamic Law in Practice
Saudi Arabia presents the best example of the application of
classical Islamic law, which is enshrined in the Saudi constitution as
the law of the land, 10 0 in a contemporary legal system. 10 1 The Saudi
95. SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 211. The existence of these schools underscores the
difference between Shari'a and fiqh. While Shari'a is immutable and infinite, fiqh may vary
slightly from school to school and even changes over time.
96. WAINES, supra note 87, at 86.
97. Id. If the individual believes that this fatwa accurately represents God's will in the
given circumstances, however, then he or she is likely to follow it.
98. Jurists within a school of thought will often pronounce similar fatwas, since the
answers to most problems are found within the accepted doctrine of that school. However, some
modern problems may yield differing opinions because of the inherent difficulty in applying past
doctrine to modern circumstances. Although a fatwa may become binding if adopted by a state
judge, the judge's pronouncement applies only to the case before him, and not to subsequent
cases.
99. Joseph Schacht notes that the goal of Islamic law is to "provide concrete and material
standards, and not to impose formal rules on the play of contending interests, which is the aim of
secular laws." SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 203.
100. Article I of the constitution states that "God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet,
God's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution." Article 48 states, "The courts will
apply the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah in the cases that are brought before them."
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legal system plays a dual role in Saudi society. On one hand, it is a
religious body that makes determinations of Shari'a. Muftis issue
fatwas and advise Saudi citizens on how to live in accordance with
Shari'a. On the other hand, the legal system acts as an arm of the
state to resolve disputes. Qadis (judges) apply Islamic law to resolve
individual disputes, adding finality to cases that require a
determination of varying legal opinion. Although a qadi's
determination of a legal matter may not be any more religiously
accurate than a mufti's fatwa, it becomes binding on the parties in the
dispute. In other words, "once the qadi has ruled then the act's
valuation is fixed."'0
2
Saudi judges are required to have extensive religious training
and must be equipped with the tools of ijtihad. 1°3 Saudi qadis
generally adhere to the Hanbali school of law, although theoretically
they are free to adopt the fiqh, or even jurisprudential methods, of
another school of law. 10 4 Qadis often consider fatwas from respected
muftis prior to making their determination on legal matters, but qadis
have the additional responsibility of discerning the facts of a given
dispute. A qadi's determination is only binding on the parties
involved in the dispute and does not purport to state any generally
applicable rule.
The Saudi legal system requires judges to search for their own
understanding of God's will and accordingly removes all obstacles,
such as precedent and appellate review, that might hinder a judge
from performing this subjective and religious function. Ibn Qayyim,
one of the most influential Islamic legal thinkers, noted that the
judge's role is to have an "understanding of what is obligatory in that
factual situation, that is, understanding of God's ruling that He
adjudged in His Book or upon the tongue of His Messenger for that
concrete circumstance." 10 5
101. Saudi Arabia has a contemporary Islamic legal system. Professor Frank Vogel writes
that "Islamic law is constitutionally the law of the land, the general jurisdiction is held by
traditionally trained judges who apply exclusively the Islamic law, and traditional Islamic legal
learning is still good professional training for practice." FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND
LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA XIV (2000).
102. Id. at 17. Although God may judge the act differently, the qadi's determination binds
the parties in this world.
103. Id. at 81 (describing the training and education of Saudi judges). Vogel notes that Saudi
qadis often perform "relative ijtihad." Id. In assessing the fiqh of the schools of thought, they
may weigh the various proofs before adopting a ruling. For a description of ijtihad in the Saudi
legal system, see id. at 118-165.
104. Id. at 94 (noting that a Saudi king issued an order that judges be bound by the Hanbali
school's opinion but issued a subsequent order clarifying that opinions may be made according to
alternate authoritative books).
105. Id. at 138 (quoting IBN AL.QAYYIM, I'LAM 1:87-88).
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Saudi judges enjoy a significant degree of freedom in
adjudicating cases and are constrained solely by their own conscience
in determining the will of God. A Saudi judge is "guided... not only
by fiqh doctrine, but.., by his own understanding of the texts from
the Qur'an and sunna that support these rules; he believes his
judgment comes directly from these texts, not from the Hanbali
books." 10 6 Saudi judges also see themselves as moral guardians and
"often appear as concerned with the present moral state of the parties
as with their past acts or with legal outcomes."10 7 Nevertheless, the
judicial decisions of Saudi judges are valid law and are not overturned
unless they clearly conflict with a plain meaning of the Qur'an or
Sunna.
3. Islamic Law and Western Law
Islamic law differs from Western secular law in three central
aspects. First, Islamic law derives its legitimacy from Godls and not
from the enforcement power of the state. 10 9 The violation of a law is
not merely an infringement on the social order, but a transgression
against God which warrants punishment in the afterlife. Thus,
Muslims do not view Islamic law through the eyes of Justice Holmes's
"bad man,"110 whose only concern is predicting the sanctions that a
court might impose on an act or omission. Islamic law is normative,
even in the absence of state enforcement, because it appeals to the
religious conscience of the individual.
Second, because Islamic law derives its authority from God, it
is discerned and interpreted by religious scholars rather than by state
officials. As a result, Islamic law has evolved independent from, and
often in opposition to, the state."' Religious scholars do not purport to
106. Id. at 141.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 5 (describing how Saudi Arabian law, for example, "consists of the opinions of
scholars who by their piety and learning have become qualified to interpret the scriptural
sources and derive laws"). Frank Vogel describes Islamic law as "inner-directed justification." Id.
at 25. The validation of law "arises solely from the individual conscience, as it contemplates the
revelation." Id.
109. A state that adopts Islamic law as the law of the land cannot enforce all of its provisions
because it is potentially infinite in scope and regulates private affairs that are beyond control of
the state. Even when unenforceable, however, Islamic law is still normative because it appeals to
the inner conscience of the individual. Id.
110. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1896).
111. See SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 209 (stating that "Islamic law represents an extreme
case of a 'jurists' law'; it was created and further developed by private specialists"). Under
Islamic law, secular authorities have the authority to issue rules (siyasah) in order to promote
the general welfare and the efficient administration of the state. Id. at 54. These rules are
binding on Muslims as long as they do not contradict Shari'a. Rulers may also create
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create law but only offer their understanding of God's will based on
analysis of the religious texts. As such, Islamic law consists of a series
of scholarly opinions intended to help the individual conscience
determine the value of each and every act. 112 These scholarly opinions
often differ and sometimes even contradict each other. Nevertheless,
Muslims consider these opinions to be equally valid or plausible
interpretations of law so long as they are based on the sacred sources
and employ generally accepted methods of jurisprudence.
1 3
The final difference between Islamic and Western law is that,
unlike Western legal traditions, Islamic law does not consist of
generally applicable, compulsory laws.11 4 Instead, Islamic law assigns
legal and moral value to particular acts.115 Professor Vogel describes
this as "instance-law," or law that "comes into being only as it is
applied to a particular concrete event."11 6 Thus, Islamic law generally
does not force people to act or refrain from acting. It merely helps
people evaluate their actions in God's eyes.
Considering these differences, one could argue that Islamic law
is not really "law" in the Western sense because it lacks many of the
characteristics that we deem essential to law.1 17 Generally speaking,
Western law is formulated by a state-controlled monopoly and is
backed by the enforcement power of the state. It is generally
adjudicative bodies in order to provide finality to secular disputes. These adjudicative bodies,
however, rely on Islamic law as articulated by the religious scholars.
112. There are very few laws that bind all Muslims. Only laws that are explicitly stated in
the Qur'an, or have been reached by the consensus of the Muslim community are considered
binding on all Muslims. The prohibition of pork, for example, is an explicitly stated rule that is
unanimously recognized by the Muslim community. The waiting period between divorces, on the
other hand, is a question that is open to varying "laws" because there is no explicit ruling in the
Qur'an, and is thus subject to interpretation. See VOGEL, supra note 101, at 5-9.
113. See KAMALI, supra note 6, at 229, 231 (stating that the varying opinions of jurists are
tolerated and regarded as "different manifestations of the same divine will").
114. VOGEL, supra note 101, at 23 ("[A]part from what is known of a certainty from the
Qur'an and sunna, law remains indeterminate, and no generally applicable statements of law
can bind.").
115. Muslims believe that God evaluates every act and that Muslims must account for all of
their actions in the afterlife. SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 200. In order to help Muslims evaluate
their own behavior through God's eyes, Islamic law assigns five values to behavior. Jurists refer
to obligatory acts as wajib, and forbidden acts as haram. All obligatory commands and
prohibitions are clearly established in the sacred sources, and usually entail punishment in the
secular world, as well as in the afterlife. Islamic law categorizes all other acts as mandub
(recommended), mubah (permissible), or makruh (discouraged). WAINES, supra note 87, at 78-
79.
116. VOGEL, supra note 101, at 25.
117. See SCHACHT supra note 82, at 200-01 (noting that it might "seem as if it were not
correct to speak of an Islamic law at all," and cautioning that "[t]he term must indeed be used
with the proviso that Islamic law is part of a system of religious duties, blended with non-legal
elements").
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accessible, generally applicable, and consistent. 118 Furthermore, the
legitimacy of Western law is determined by state actors, not by the
individuals whom it governs.
Islamic "law", on the other hand, does not strive for stability,
predictability, or consistency. The goal of Islamic law is to draw as
near as possible to God's true evaluation of each particular event.119
Since humans have an imperfect and incomplete understanding of
God's will, Islamic law accepts the necessity of uncertainty and values
the search for divine truth over stability and predictability. 120 More
significantly, there is no system or rule (apart from those rules that
have been adopted through ijma) that determines which laws are valid
or legitimate. Islamic law's legitimacy appeals to the inner conscience
of the individual; thus, the individual is free to choose which laws to
obey. 121 The state only intervenes in a limited number of situations
(such as criminal prosecutions) where there is a need to add finality to
disputed opinions concerning an act's legal value. Even in these cases,
however, the judge does not purport to recognize the validity of a
generally applicable law but only makes a legal determination of a
particular act in the particular circumstances. Finally, unlike
Western law, Islamic law is interpreted primarily by religious scholars
without regard to its enforcement. Islamic scholars arduously defend
their right to define and articulate Shari'a and thus resist any
attempts to codify law or make it accessible to the general public.
Ascribing the term "law" to both the Western secular model
and to the Islamic model obfuscates many of these fundamental
differences and perpetuates a misunderstanding of fiqh and Shari'a. 1
22
Judges who are unfamiliar with the nature of Islamic law 23 may
assume that it shares many of the characteristics of Western secular
law-i.e., that it is accessible, generally applicable, consistent, etc.
The tendency to ascribe the characteristics of Western secular law to
118. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-94 (2nd ed. 1969) (discussing the
essential characteristics of law).
119. VOGEL, supra note 101, at 15-17 (noting that Muslims believe that God judges each
person's actions and that the role of Islamic law is to determine how God evaluates these acts).
120. Id. In a letter purportedly from the second Caliph, Umar bin al-Khattab, he instructed
the governor of Basra on the function of the judge: "Do not let a judgment which you judged
yesterday and then reconsidered, and about which you were guided to a wiser opinion, prevent
you from returning to the truth .... Id. at 15.
121. Id. at 22-25 (stating that much of Islamic law is not enforced by the state and therefore
appeals only to the conscience of the individual).
122. I do not argue that Western law is better or more effective than Islamic law, only that it
makes little sense to ascribe the same word to two concepts that have different, and often
conflicting, characteristics.




Islamic law creates a problem when judges attempt to interpret
Islamic law in contract disputes.
124
B. Problems for Neutral Principles
From this brief discussion of Islamic law, one can see that a
judge faces three First Amendment problems when applying the
neutral-principles doctrine to Islamic contracts. First, in Islamic
contracts, it is often impossible to distinguish secular terms from
religious terms.1 25 One scholar noted that the Shari'a "draws no
distinction between the religious and the secular, between legal,
ethical, and moral questions, or between the public and private
aspects of a Muslim's life."1 26  Because Muslims believe that God
judges every action, 27 Islamic law governs all matters ranging from
prayer, to inheritance, to dietary regulations. Accordingly, many
Arabic terms have a common, everyday meaning but also a slightly
different meaning under Islamic law.1 28 These legal meanings may
also vary among the four schools of Islamic jurisprudential thought.1 29
Thus, any attempt to scrutinize an Islamic contract in "purely secular
terms" will most likely fail, violating the neutral-principles doctrine.
The second problem that arises stems from the fact that the
interpretation of an Islamic legal term requires a judicial
determination of religious doctrine. In adjudicating Christian or
Jewish disputes, courts have avoided First Amendment problems by
deferring to hierarchical authorities within the church or synagogue
on certain questions of religious doctrine or interpretation, or by
124. See discussion infra Part III.B-C.
125. Even if a court can separate secular legal terms and religious terms, it may be difficult
to extract legal obligations from religious documents. Such documents may only be intended to
confer religious obligations, not secular obligations. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 141
(N.Y. 1983) (Jones, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should not enforce a Ketubah, a
document created as part of a Jewish wedding ceremony, because doing so would require it to
interpret Jewish law and tradition).
126. Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari'a and the
Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV 1949, 1964 (1995). Joseph Schacht notes that Islamic
law "regulate[s] the life of every Muslim in all its aspects; it comprises on an equal footing
ordinances regarding worship and ritual, as well as political and (in the narrow sense) legal
rules." SCHACHT, supra note 82, at 1.
127. VOGEL, supra note 101, at 25 (noting that the goal of Islamic law is to "draw as near as
possible to God's true evaluation for each particular event").
128. Using one Islamic jurisprudential tool, for example, an Islamic jurist may substitute the
plain meaning of a word for a more obscure meaning of that word in order to promote the social
welfare.
129. VOGEL, supra note 101, at 43-45 (describing the differences in the schools of law).
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referring to authoritative interpretations. In Islamic law, however,
there is no preeminent canonical court to make definitive rulings on
religious doctrine or policy. Furthermore, because the concept of
precedent does not exist in Islamic law, judges cannot merely apply
the rulings of other Muslim judges. 130 Nor can a U.S. judge defer to
the advice of expert witnesses because no witness can say what the
correct binding interpretation is (unless the matter has been resolved
by ijma).13
1
Finally, judicial interpretation may unconstitutionally endorse
one school's interpretation of Islamic law over another. Islam is a
pluralistic religion, and no single authority can speak on behalf of the
faithful; ultimate authority rests with God alone. The four main
schools-Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali, and Shafi-have reached ijma on
many of the fundamental points of Islamic law, but they also disagree
on many of its more complex aspects. Thus, any judicial resolution on
the meaning of Islamic law may involve the adoption of one school's
interpretation of Islamic law. Such an adoption would
unconstitutionally endorse one school's view over the others' view.
132
This determination might also frustrate the intent of the contracting
parties, especially if there is evidence that they desired the contract to
be interpreted in accordance with a particular school's fiqh.
C. Case Studies
Several courts have not heeded these First Amendment
constraints and have adjudicated disputes concerning Islamic law.
The following three case studies highlight some of the constitutional
problems that courts encounter when applying the neutral-principles
approach to contracts that incorporate Islamic law.
1. Commercial Contracts That Request Application of Saudi Law
U.S. courts may have to make determinations of Islamic law
when parties contractually agree to be bound by the law of Saudi
130. Id. at 15 (noting that an Islamic jurist "must strive for the divine truth for each case
that confronts him, without being bound by past opinions, even his own").
131. Unless the issue has been resolved by ijma (consensus).
132. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995)
In this case, the Fourth Circuit struck down a city ordinance enforcing Orthodox kosher laws as
unconstitutional. Judge Luttig, concurring with the judgment, stated that the law violated the
Establishment Clause because it unconstitutionally favored one sect's definition of kosher over
all others. He noted that "various branches of Judaism define kosher differently... and ... these
differences are significant to adherents of the various sects of faith." Id. at 1347. By using the
Orthodox Jewish definition of kosher for the basis of enforcing its kosher laws, the city
"unquestionably expressed an impermissible intrafaith denominational preference." Id. at 1348.
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Arabia (which has adopted the uncodified, classical Islamic law as the
law of the land). In such a case, when a party files suit in the United
States, the law of the forum state governs the interpretation of the
contract, but Saudi law, and therefore Islamic law, governs the
obligations of the parties to the contract.
In National Group for Communications & Technology v. Lucent
Technology Int'l, National Group for Communications and Computers
Ltd., ("NGC") filed suit against Lucent Technologies International
("LTI") in a U.S. district court for breach of a telecommunications
contract.133 Several years before, NGC, a Saudi company, entered into
a contract with LTI to assist in the completion of a multi-billion dollar
project that LTI had undertaken for the government of Saudi Arabia.
Under the contract, NGC agreed to perform design and engineering
services, and install emergency and pay telephones along Saudi
Arabia's highways. LTI and NGC agreed to a four-year relationship at
a fixed value of $75,460,902. LTI subsequently terminated its contract
with NGC, forcing NGC to liquidate the Projects Department that it
had created in order to carry out its telecommunications contracts. As
a result, NGC brought suit requesting actual and expectation damages
for breach of contract.
At trial, both NGC and LTI agreed that Saudi law governed the
terms of the contract. The district court agreed and noted that its role
in resolving the contractual dispute was to ascertain how a Saudi
judge would resolve the dispute if it were brought in a Saudi court.
The court acknowledged that Saudi judges apply classical Islamic
law134 and thus turn to the "aforementioned Qur'an, the Sunna, and
fiqh" in making legal determinations. 135 Furthermore, the court
noted, "Saudi Arabian judges are not bound by judicial precedent ...
and the concept of stare decisis does not exist. Instead, judges 'must
strive for the divine truth for each case that confronts him, without
being bound by past opinions, even his own."'
13 6
The court found that LTI had breached the contract and then
turned to Islamic law to determine whether LTI was liable for
133. National Group for Commc'ns & Computers v. Lucent Techs. Int'l, 331 F. Supp. 2d 290,
292 (D.N.J 2004). The facts of this case are summarized on pages 290-293.
134. The court wrote that Article I of the '"Basic Regulations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'
states in pertinent part . . . [t]he religion of [Saudi Arabia] is Islam, its constitution is the book of
God Most High and the Sunna of His Prophet, may God bless him and give him peace." Article 48
adds, "The courts shall apply in cases brought before them the rules of the Islamic Shari'a in
agreement with the indications in the Book and the Sunna." Id. at 294-95.
135. Id. at 295.
136. Id. (citation omitted).
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expectation damages. 137 The court stated that "[a]dhering to the
principles of Shari'a, when the [Saudi court] faces a breach of contract
action, the quantum of damages recoverable will 'fall short of the
mark which might reasonably be anticipated under English law."'
138
This is due largely to the fact, the court noted, that Shari'a prohibits
gharar (risk or uncertainty) in contracts because only God can predict
future activity. The court went on to cite several statements by the
Prophet Muhammed as evidence of the prohibition of gharar. 39 Thus,
reasoned the court, Islamic law does not recognize damages for losses
beyond what is actual and direct.
NGC argued that awarding expectation damages in this case
would not violate the prohibition of gharar because "only when gharar
inheres within a separate entity is it forbidden."1 40 The court rejected
this argument, stating that the plaintiffs "lack meaningful supporting
religious... authority."141 It added that "[t]his Court does not accept
the suggestion that the conservative highly-religious Saudi Arabian
courts would find significance in superficial differences in the
presentation of gharar sufficient to overcome the dictates of the
Shari'a."
142
The judge's resolution of this contract dispute violated the First
Amendment. In applying Saudi law (and thus Islamic law) to
determine the parties' rights under the contract, the judge had to
conduct an extensive inquiry in to Islamic law and make an
independent determination of religious doctrine: the precise scope of
the prohibition of gharar. The judge could not rely on secular tools to
make this determination because Saudi law is not codified 43 and
judicial decisions are not reported. Rather, the judge took on the role
of a Muslim qadi, rejecting the plaintiffs argument because it lacked
"supporting religious authority."144  This inquiry into religious
137. Id. at 298-301. The court relied heavily on expert testimony from several Islamic legal
scholars in its description of the Saudi legal system and application of Islamic law. Id. at 294.
138. Id. at 297.
139. The court noted the following hadith: "Do not buy fish in the sea, for it is gharar; The
Prophet forbade sale of what is in the wombs, sale of the contents of the udders, sale of a slave
when he is runaway ...; The Messenger of God forbade the [sale of] the copulation of the stallion.
He who purchases food shall not sell it until he weighs it." Id. at 296.
140. Id. at 298.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. There are a few generally applicable laws in Saudi Arabia, but Saudi judges often
disregard these regulations in favor of classical Islamic law or their own subjective interpretation
of God's will. See discussion supra Part W.A.




doctrine is precisely the type of judicial action that concerned Justice
Souter and that is prohibited by the First Amendment.
2. Islamic Marriage Contracts
In the United States, state courts frequently oversee divorce
proceedings and therefore must interpret marital contracts. Because
marriage is both a religious and civil union, many marital contracts
incorporate religious and secular rights and obligations. Courts may
enforce religion-based marriage contracts as long as their
interpretation does not require the court to determine matters of
religious doctrine. 145 Thus, when adjudicating divorce proceedings,
courts must sift through the marriage contract and separate the
purely secular obligations from the religious ones. 146  This
determination is particularly difficult, however, when judges confront
religions with which they are unfamiliar, such as Islam.
As in many cultures, marriage plays a central role in Islamic
society. It serves as the foundation for the family unit, provides legal
and moral sanction for sexual intercourse, helps guard against
promiscuity, and generally promotes social harmony.147 Due to its
social importance, the Qur'an regulates the proper procedures for
marriage, divorce, division of assets, and re-marriage. More
significantly, Islamic law dictates the rights and obligations that each
party must undertake throughout the marriage. The man takes on
the obligation of financially providing for his wife and children. The
woman must recognize her husband's authority over the family, and
contribute to the upbringing of the children and the maintenance of
the household. These duties are both civic and religious.
Like all other contracts, a marriage contract is completed upon
offer and acceptance. Typically, the groom and the bride's
representative sign the marriage contract before two witnesses on the
day of the marriage. The parties are free to negotiate the terms of the
marriage such as the amount of the mahr or sadaq (dowry), the rights
of the groom to take other brides, and the right of the bride to initiate
divorce. The mahr is essential to every Muslim marriage. It is a
symbol of the man's commitment to the marriage and acts as an
economic safeguard for the woman and children in case of divorce.
145. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that a court could
enforce a Ketubah, a document created as part of a Jewish wedding ceremony, if it contained
"neutral principles of law").
146. Id.
147. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 16 (1st ed. 1982). I relied on pages
13-24 for the information in this and the following paragraph.
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Not surprisingly, the payment of the mahr or sadaq is an issue that
courts often have to deal with upon the dissolution of marriages in the
United States.
The following two cases highlight the challenges courts face in
interpreting Islamic marriage contracts. In these two similar cases
the state court judges reached opposite conclusions about the legal
significance of the mahr.
In In re Marriage of Shaban, a couple married in Egypt in
1974, and later filed for divorce in California in 1998.148 The husband
claimed that the couple had signed a prenuptial agreement in Egypt,
and pursuant to this contract, the wife was not entitled to any of his
assets. 149 The husband presented the Islamic marriage contract as
evidence of their pre-marital agreement. The contract stipulated that
the husband would pay his wife a mahr of 500 Egyptian pounds
("LE"). Twenty-five piasters 150 were due at the commencement of the
marriage, while the remaining LE 499.75 would be due if the
marriage ended in divorce. The contract also stated, "The above legal
marriage has been concluded in Accordance with his Almighty God's
Holy Book and the Rules of his Prophet to whom all God's prayers and
blessings be, by legal offer and acceptance from the two contracting
parties."' 5'
The husband argued that this clause indicated that the parties
intended Islamic law to govern the contract, and thus the wife was
entitled to the mahr (about $30) but not to any of his assets. The
court ruled that under California contract law, the parties had failed
to create a contract because the terms of the marriage contract were
too vague.'5 2  The court reasoned that the couple's intent to be
governed by Islamic law did not entail a true meeting of the minds
and was therefore unenforceable. 53 The court pointed out that any
expert who opined on the parties' rights under Islamic law would also
have to speculate as to which of the four schools of thought would
govern the interpretation of the terms of the contract. 154 Thus, the
court disregarded the terms of the Islamic marriage contract and
divided the property according to California community property laws.
Conversely, in Akileh v. Elchahal a different court was willing
to find an enforceable Islamic marital contract and awarded the wife
148. In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
149. Id. These facts are summarized on pages 865-867.
150. 1 piaster is 1/100 of an Egyptian pound.
151. In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865, n.1.





the payment of the sadaq. 155 Shortly before the marriage at issue in
this case, Akileh (the groom) and Elchahal's father discussed the
terms of the marriage contract, including the amount of the sadaq.
The father stated that he desired a sadaq of $50,001, with an initial
payment of $1 and a deferred payment of $50,000.156 Akileh agreed to
these terms, and the couple was married in the United States. Soon
thereafter, the marriage began to deteriorate, and Elchahal filed for
divorce.
The main issue in the divorce proceedings was whether Akileh
was obliged to pay the deferred dowry of $50,000.157 Akileh testified
that the term "sadaq" confers an obligation on the husband only if he
initiates the divorce. Elchahal argued that the payment of a sadaq is
not conditioned on who initiates the divorce and is the wife's absolute
right. The court noted that it had the authority to require a party to
"fulfill the secular obligations of a religious antenuptial agreement"
using the neutral principles of law. 158 The court found that the term
"sadaq" was a secular term and then looked to parole evidence to
determine the subjective intent of the parties. The court concluded
that the sadaq agreement was intended to "protect the wife in case of
divorce" and held that Akileh was obliged to pay the $50,000 to his ex-
wife as stipulated in the contract. 159
Although the court purported to rely on neutral principles, it
ignored the religious significance of the sadaq. Moreover, the court
could not successfully rely on neutral principles of contract law to
determine the intent of the parties because the parties intended their
contractual obligations to conform to Islamic law.160 The term "sadaq"
is not merely a secular term; the payment of the sadaq is a religious
obligation, determined by Islamic law. Thus, in order to enforce the
intent of the parties (who desired to abide by Islamic law) the judge
had to determine whether the husband was required to pay the sadaq
under Islamic law.
There is no clear answer to this question. Islamic legal
scholars debate whether a man is obliged to pay the sadaq if the
155. Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). A sadaq is merely a
postponed mahr that is meant to provide the wife with additional economic protection in case of
divorce.
156. Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 247. The facts of this case are summarized on pages 247-48.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 249.
159. Id.
160. Parties often do not carefully and explicitly state their subjective intent in such
religious contracts. Compliance with Islamic law is more important than enforcement of the
explicit provisions of a contract. Thus, contracts are deliberately vague, and parties rely on the
religious advice of muftis or qadis in case of dispute.
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woman initiates the divorce because, in such cases, the original
reasons for providing the sadaq no longer apply. The sadaq or mahr
was originally intended to restrict the man's power of divorce by
imposing a financial burden on him. Payment of the sadaq was also
meant to protect the woman-who was often financially dependant on
her husband-in case of divorce, and to compensate her for the man's
unilateral right to divorce in many circumstances. 161 Under some
schools of thought, the woman waives her right to the unpaid portion
of the sadaq if she initiates divorce. 162 Other schools have devised
certain conditions under which the woman is still entitled to the
remaining portion of the sadaq, such as when the husband is abusive
or commits apostasy. Thus, the judge's decision in Akileh may have
had support in Islamic law. Yet, in determining that the man was
obliged to pay the sadaq, the judge made a determination of religious
doctrine and expressed a preference for one school's interpretation of
Islamic law over other equally valid interpretations.
63
These three cases evidence the problems that might arise when
interpreting contracts that contain Islamic legal terms or are governed
by Islamic law. In Lucent Technologies, the court departed
significantly from the neutral-principles doctrine as it made an
independent determination of Shari'a to resolve a telecommunications
dispute. Likewise, in Akileh, the court ignored the religious aspects of
the contract. The court in Shaban realized the difficulty in
interpreting Islamic legal contracts, and simply ignored the contract
altogether. This Note argues that none of these three courts resolved
their respective disputes in a way that complies with both the First
Amendment and the intent of the parties. Yet, as this Note argues,
there is a way to accomplish both goals.
V. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: ISLAMIC ARBITRATION
As seen in the last Part, courts unintentionally violate the First
Amendment when interpreting Islamic legal contracts. Despite the
161. Lindsey Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: Interpreting
Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 201
(2002).
162. DAVID PEARL, A TEXTBOOK ON MUSLIM PERSONAL LAw 44, 102-03 (1979).
163. Compare this decision to state laws that prohibit fraud in the sale of kosher foods and
impose criminal liability on any food vender that falsely claims meat containing pork is Kosher.
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-942 (2006). Kent Greenwalt suggests that one could object to
such a law on the grounds that the state must decide whether someone violates religious law. He
argues that this objection would fail, however, because it is beyond all doubt that pork is
prohibited under Jewish law. Thus, the state does not have to settle any question or controversy
of religious law. Greenwalt, supra note 18, at 791-92.
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harm caused by these constitutional violations, states have a
legitimate interest in adjudicating contractual disputes that involve
secular rights and obligations. Moreover, denying individuals or
religious organizations the opportunity to adjudicate their contract
disputes might raise a different set of concerns under the Free
Exercise Clause.164 Therefore, courts need an approach that reconciles
the First Amendment constitutional concerns with the states' (and
individuals') interest in peacefully resolving disputes. This Note
argues that Islamic arbitration is the best way to reconcile these
interests. This Part will describe how courts can use Islamic
arbitration and why doing so is consistent with contract law. Finally,
it will discuss some problems that courts might encounter while
appealing to Islamic arbitration.
A. The Proposal
In order to satisfy the competing interests of abiding by the
First Amendment and providing a forum for relief, judges should infer
an arbitration clause into Islamic contracts in order to give full effect
to the intent of the parties. The inferred arbitration clause would
require the parties to seek arbitration to determine the meaning of the
disputed Islamic legal term or the correct application of Islamic law.
After the arbitrator makes the religious determination, the judge can
then enforce the contract without violating the First Amendment.
Although judges have not taken such action in the past, the accepted
practice of supplying gap-fillers lends support to this possibility. The
Second Restatement of Contracts states that a judge may supply an
omitted term if it is "essential to a determination of [the parties']
rights and duties .... ,,165 Since a judge may supply a term, such as
the price of the goods, essential to the enforcement of the contract, it
stands to reason that a judge could imply an arbitration clause into
the contract when the contract would otherwise be unenforceable due
to the First Amendment.
Implying an arbitration clause does not change or alter the
parties' rights and obligations under the contract; it merely helps the
state enforce them. If, as this Note suggests, judicial interpretation of
Islamic terms or Islamic law violates the First Amendment, then the
addition of such a clause would be the sole way for a judge to
determine the rights and duties of the parties. Even if a judge does not
164. Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d. 1244, 1248 (9th
Cir. 1999).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204.
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go so far as implying an arbitration clause into the contract, the judge
could strongly urge the litigants to seek arbitration and explain the
court's ability to enforce the contract after the arbitrator makes his or
her determination.
1. Arbitration Avoids First Amendment Problems
Arbitration avoids conflict with the Establishment Clause. As
explained above, when judges confront a religious contract, they must
apply state contract law to interpret it.166 The First Amendment only
restricts judicial interpretation of contracts when the parties dispute
the meanings of the terms of the contract or the application of
religious law. 167 If parties assign the same meaning to the terms of
the contract, or the arbitrator resolves the dispute, then the court can
enforce the contract without overstepping its First Amendment
bounds. 168
By deferring the determination of Islamic law to a mutually
agreed arbitrator, the court would avoid entangling itself with
religion. Furthermore, the court would not unconstitutionally endorse
one school's interpretation of Islamic law over another school's
interpretation. The court, in fact, would not endorse any particular
view because the parties choose the arbitrator, and in effect, the school
of thought. The court would merely enforce the original intent of the
parties with the arbitrator's determination serving to clarify certain
terms that the court is not capable of interpreting.
166. The judge's goal is to "carry out the understanding of the parties rather than to impose
obligations on them contrary to their understanding." Id. § 201, cmt. C.
167. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the First Amendment constraints on judicial
interpretation of religious contracts). The judge could interpret the disputed term if there was
sufficient evidence that the parties arrived at a mutual understanding of that term. Such a
mutual understanding would be difficult to ascertain, however, because under Islamic law
promises change with the circumstances. Thus, the term "sadaq" might carry a certain meaning
in some circumstances, but a different meaning in other circumstances. Since it is incredibly
difficult to foresee the circumstances of the future, it is difficult to reach a mutual understanding
of a legal term. As a result, parties rely on religious scholars to define the legal term in light of
the circumstances of the dispute.
168. "Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a




2. Arbitration Enforces the Parties' Original Intent
Given the indeterminacy of Islamic law, parties cannot ascribe
precise meanings to Islamic legal terms when drafting contracts.
169
The parties may have a general understanding of the terms or the
relevant law, but they cannot arrive at a complete meeting of the
minds. 170 Moreover, since Shari'a, and not the parties themselves,
determines their contractual rights and obligations, the parties
depend on religious scholars to define these terms and identify these
rights if a dispute arises.' 7' Such a determination can only be made
by an Islamic scholar trained in Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, ordering
the parties to seek arbitration is necessary to give effect to the parties'
original intention to abide by Shari'a in the performance of their
contract.
Consider the intent of the parties in the three contracts
previously examined in this Note. In Lucent Technologies, the parties
agreed to be bound by Saudi law. When parties contractually agree to
be governed by Saudi law, they intend to be governed by Islamic law,
which is accessible only to qualified Islamic jurists. The parties
cannot reach a mutual understanding of the specific, generally
applicable rules to be applied because Saudi law is uncodified, and
definitive determinations of law are made only in concrete cases,
reflecting the personal conscience of a single judge.172 Thus, a judicial
determination of Saudi law by a U.S. judge, who is not trained in
Islamic jurisprudence, may defeat the intent of the parties to the
contract.
Similarly, in Akileh, there is no evidence that the married
couple had a meeting of the minds with respect to the precise meaning
of the term "sadaq." The four schools of thought disagree on the
169. Muslims can only have definite knowledge of Islamic law if the rule is "stated
categorically and clearly in a Qur'anic verse or in an authentic hadith." VOGEL, supra note 101,
at 22. The number of such known laws, however, is relatively small, and most modern legal
issues cannot be clearly determined from the Qur'an or from a hadith.
170. In Islamic law, the terms of a private contract will not be enforced unless they are in
accordance with Shari'a. Under the laws of Shari'a, the circumstances control the promise.
BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB LAWS 274 (2000). As the circumstances change,
the legal obligations may change as well. This unique construction of promises is due to the
indeterminate nature of Islamic law. Islamic law is "instance-law"; it is indeterminate until it
fuses with a particular event. VOGEL, supra note 101, at 25. Therefore, the precise meaning of an
Islamic legal term, or the legality of a proposed act, cannot be definitively determined prior to
the events that give rise to the dispute.
171. See COMAIR-OBEID, supra note 5, at 5 (1996) (noting that the Shari'a, not the parties,
determines their respective rights once the contract has been formed).
172. VOGEL, supra note 101, at 117.
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circumstances in which a woman may forfeit her sadaq or mahr. 173
Lay Muslims cannot be presumed to have knowledge of these complex
Islamic legal issues and most likely do not comprehend the full
significance of such terms. When the couple incorporated a Qur'anic
term into their marriage contract, they implicitly understood that a
religious scholar would resolve any dispute over the meaning of that
word in accordance with Islamic law.
In In Re Shaban, the judge recognized the inherent difficulty in
discerning the intent of the contracting parties. Although the judge
correctly refrained from determining the circumstances in which
Islamic law requires payment of a mahr, the court frustrated the
parties' original intent by declaring that no contract had been formed,
and dividing the property under California common law. In all three
of these cases, the court could more effectively enforce the parties'
intent by deferring the matter to arbitration.
B. Problems
There are three potential problems with implying arbitration
clauses into contracts that contain Islamic law. First, this approach
assumes that Muslims incorporate Islamic legal terms into their
contract because they desire to act in accordance with Shari'a. This
assumption may not always be accurate. Muslims may incorporate
Islamic legal terms for a variety of reasons: custom, ignorance of
Western legal systems, family pressure, etc. Thus, if Muslims do not
desire to act in accordance with Shari'a, then they might intend to
attach a fixed meaning to the terms of the contract.
Contract law can help solve this problem. The terms of a
contract are interpreted in "light of all the circumstances."'174 A judge
can look at the circumstances of the contract and attempt to
determine whether the parties intended the terms of the contract to be
determined in accordance with Islamic law. If there is evidence that
the parties intended the term to be interpreted in accordance with
Shari'a, then the court can order arbitration. Likewise, if there is
evidence that the parties reached a concrete understanding regarding
the terms of the contract, regardless of its conformity with Shari'a,
then the judge can interpret the meaning that the parties had
173. Blenkhorn, supra note 161, at 201 (providing examples of the various circumstances in
which a man may avoid paying the mahr upon divorce, but noting that the four schools of
thought do not agree on all of these circumstances).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1).
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originally agreed upon without resorting to arbitration. 175 Judges
must not, however, rely on the advice of expert witnesses to provide
the meaning of the disputed term.
The second problem is that parties may frustrate judicial
enforcement by intentionally failing to agree on an arbitrator. The
court may not appoint an arbitrator because it is unconstitutional for
a judge to delegate her civic authority to another group or individual
chosen according to a religious criterion. 176 Courts can enforce an
implied arbitration clause, but the parties must mutually agree on the
arbitrator in order for the arbitration to be successful. As a result, one
or both parties can frustrate judicial enforcement by refusing to agree
on an arbitrator. In such cases, one party could sue for breach of
contract if there is evidence that the other party is acting in bad faith.
Such a claim, however, would be difficult to substantiate.
Parties may not be so reluctant to seek arbitration. 177 Parties
who contractually agree that Saudi law, and thus Islamic law, will
govern their contractual disputes often file in the United States
because of the backlog of cases and inefficiency of the Saudi court
system. 178 Individuals who incorporate Islamic terms into their
contract might also willingly comply with arbitration because of the
desire to abide by Shari'a. A ruling by a religious authority is more
likely to yield a result that is in accordance with Shari'a than a ruling
by a non-Muslim judge.
Finally, courts might be reluctant to order arbitration for fear
that the arbitration would result in an outcome that would be unjust
or unconscionable. Many Westerners believe-rightly or wrongly-
that Islamic law, especially family law, does not adequately protect
women's interests. 79 In In Re Marriage of Shaban, for example, the
court might have been reluctant to find that the parties had formed a
contract because, under the disputed prenuptial agreement, the wife
175. The specificity with which the parties define the terms may imply that the parties
reached a mutual understanding regarding their meaning.
176. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumett, 512 U.S. 687, 698 (1994).
177. Arbitration has become an accepted form of dispute resolution in the Middle East. One
commentator noted that "ADR has become increasingly important as a vehicle for settling
disputes involving Middle East parties." David N. Kay, Practical Aspects of Arbitration with
Middle Eastern Parties, in ARAB COMMERCIAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES (William
Ballantyne ed., 2002).
178. See George Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi
Arabia, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 905, 909 (2003) (noting that although Saudi judges "have a
reputation for fairness and impartiality ... [t]here is a serious backlog of cases aggravated by
lack of sophisticated administrative support").
179. As the current controversy in Canada suggests, opponents of Islamic arbitration in the




would receive only thirty dollars after more than two decades of
marriage. Again, contract law can solve this problem. A judge may
refuse to enforce an arbitration award that is unconscionable or
against public policy.1 80 Thus, even though a judge defers a matter to
arbitration, she can still protect the parties' and society's interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts must remember their constitutional limits when
resolving contractual disputes that require interpretation of a
disputed Islamic legal term or application of Islamic law. A better
understanding of Islamic law will help judges adjudicate these
contractual disputes while complying with the constraints of the First
Amendment. The three cases examined in this Note represent just a
small sample of the different types of Islamic contracts that courts
may be asked to interpret. Naturally, Islamic contracts will vary
greatly with respect to their purpose, specificity, and complexity. In
many circumstances, judges may adequately be able to use the tools of
contract law to discern the intent of the drafters without any reference
to religious doctrine. Nevertheless, these three case studies are useful
because they represent fairly common contracts and illustrate some of
the problems that courts confront in interpreting them.
When asked to interpret Islamic legal contracts, judges should
keep in mind several guidelines. First, judges themselves should not
apply Saudi law to a contract dispute. Saudi law is generally
inaccessible to U.S. judges, except perhaps to a Muslim judge.'8 ' U.S.
judges cannot look to statutes, case law, or precedent to determine the
Saudi law to be applied to the case. Furthermore, they do not have
the requisite knowledge of the sacred sources, nor are they capable of
performing the ijtihad that Saudi judges must perform in making
legal determinations under Saudi law.
Second, judges should not determine the meaning of disputed
Islamic legal terms.18 2 Islamic legal terms do not have a single,
commonly accepted meaning known to all Muslims. The precise
180. 'The law has a long history of recognizing the general rule that certain contracts,
though properly entered into in all other respects, will not be enforced, or at least will not be
enforced fully, if found to be contrary to public policy." CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.1 (2004). See
also Waddell & Keegan, supra note 68, at 604.
181. A Muslim judge, of course, would still be bound by the First Amendment even if he were
qualified to make the religious determination.
182. The meaning of some Islamic legal terms is definitively known through ijma. The
Muslim community may unanimously agree on their meaning because they are clearly stated




meaning of Islamic legal terms can be known only to God. Religious
scholars strive to approximate God's understanding of these terms,
but they may disagree on their respective conclusions. The indefinite
nature of Islamic law is accepted in Islam, and the varying meanings
are regarded as equally valid.
183
Finally, judges should defer the interpretation of Islamic legal
terms to a religious arbitrator. Given the indeterminacy of Islamic
law, judges may find that the parties mutually understood that an
Islamic legal scholar would resolve the precise meaning of disputed
terms. Arbitration is consistent with contract law since the goal of the
judge is to enforce what the parties mutually understood when
drafting the contract and to avoid imposing obligations on the parties
that were not contemplated.1 8 4 By incorporating Islamic law into
contracts, many Muslims express a desire to act according to Shari'a.
A secular court's resolution of the dispute may hinder this objective.
These guidelines will help judges adjudicate contractual
disputes while staying within the constitutional limits imposed by the
First Amendment. Even though parties may not object to judicial
interpretation of religious contracts, it is prudent (and constitutionally
mandated) to maintain a wall of separation between state and
religion. Deferring the determination of Islamic legal terms and
Islamic law to religious arbitrators provides a forum for relief and
upholds the intent of the contracting parties. Most importantly, such
an approach protects the sanctity and authenticity of Islamic law.
Charles P. Trumbull *
183. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
184. See discussion supra Part II.
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